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Public Trust or Equal Footing: A Historical Look at Public
Use Rights in American Waters
Sean Morrison*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN EARLY AMERICAN COURTS
A. New Jersey Before and After Martin v. Lessee of Waddell
B. Other State Law Decisions after Martin and Pollard v. Hagan
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FEDERAL DEFINITION OF NAVIGABLE WATERS
FOR PURPOSES OF TITLE
IV. THE CONTINUED RELIANCE ON STATE LAW DEFINITIONS OF NAVIGABLE
WATERS FOR PURPOSES OF TITLE
A. The Great Inland Seas Exception: Hardin and Illinois Central
B. After Illinois Central: Shively v. Bowlby and Donnelly v. United States
V. THE SWITCH FROM A STATE TO FEDERAL LAW DEFINITION OF NAVIGABLE
WATERS FOR PURPOSES OF TITLE
A. The Brewer-Holt-Utah Trilogy
B. Considerations of the Equal Footing Doctrine as Applied to
Navigable Waters
VI. THE PERSISTENCE OF PUBLIC USE RIGHTS IN PRIVATE WATERS
A. The Public Use Servitude
B. The Public Trust Doctrine
VII. CONCLUSION
To hand over all these lakes to private ownership,
under any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a
great wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of
which, cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated. 1

* Harvard Law School, J.D. (expected 2015). With deep gratitude to Professor Joseph
William Singer for his wisdom, insight and encouragement, the editors of the WestNorthwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy for their help and patience, and my
family and friends in Montana.
1.

Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn.1893).
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I. Introduction
In 2003, the State of Montana brought a lawsuit in state court seeking
to recover $41 million in rent from the owner of several hydroelectric dams
that the state claimed lie on state-owned riverbeds. 2 The dams in question
belong to PPL Montana, LLC and lie on portions of the Missouri, Madison,
and Clark Fork Rivers. 3 Under the “equal footing doctrine,” if a body of water
is navigable, the submerged land belongs to the state. 4 If it is nonnavigable,
the submerged land belongs to the private riparian landowners. 5 The State
of Montana argued that navigability should be determined for the whole
river, while PPL Montana argued that each segment of the river should be
tested for navigability to determine ownership. 6 Both parties agreed the
question is a matter of federal law. 7 In a unanimous opinion, the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the “whole river approach.” 8 Ensuing academic
scholarship offers a range of nuanced thoughts about the impact this
decision may have on natural resource management. 9 A less discussed but
perhaps more important part of the Supreme Court’s opinion is the attempt
to define the relationship between the “public trust doctrine” and the “equal
footing doctrine.”

2. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1231 (2012). The suit is was in
fact initiated by parents of schoolchildren who claimed that the dams sit on state
school trust land. Id. at 1225.
3. Landon Newell, PPL Montana: The Supreme Court’s Modern Day City Slicker
Approach for Determining the Navigability for Title Test, 33 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 274
(2013).
4.

Id. at 275.

5. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935) (“[I]f the waters are
not navigable in fact, the title of the United States to land underlying them remains
unaffected by the creation of the new state.”).
6.

Newell, supra note 3, at 274.

7. See Brief for Respondent at 2, PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. 1215 (No. 10-218); Reply
Brief of Petitioner at 3, PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. 1215 (No. 10-218).
8.

PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1232.

9. Some academics credit the Court for clarifying the legal rule for title of
riverbeds and ensuring that more rivers are protected by federal ownership. See Amy
Wegner Kho, What Lies Beneath Troubled Waters: The Determination of Navigable Rivers in PPL
Montana, LLC, v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012), 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 489, 500
(2012); see also Rachael Lipinski, The Dividing Line: Applying the Navigability-For-Title Test
After PPL Montana, 91 OR. L. REV. 247, 271 (2012). Others argue that the decision
makes it “more difficult to manage, preserve, and/or protect” rivers by fragmenting
responsibilities. See Newell, supra note 3, at 291.
70
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The State of Montana impressed upon the Court that denying the state
title to the underlying bed for portions of rivers would transfer from state
ownership to private ownership submerged lands protected by the state
public trust doctrine. 10 This, the State argued, warranted “the caution [the
Court] typically exercises in matters impeding state sovereignty.” 11 The
Court however dismissed this concern, stating that the “suggestion
underscores the State’s misapprehension of the equal footing and the public
trust doctrine.” 12
“Unlike the equal-footing doctrine, which is the
constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title,” the
Court asserted, “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law . . . .
Under the accepted principles of federalism, the States retain residual power
to determine the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders,
while federal law determines riverbed title under the equal-footing
doctrine.” 13 In other words, the Court’s decision suggests that submerged
lands might be both privately owned and protected by the state’s public
trust doctrine.
When the PPL Montana opinion was announced, another suit was
underway in Montana over public rights in privately owned rivers and
streams. 14 In 2005, the Public Lands Access Association filed suit in state
court claiming that electric fences on the private property of Jim Kennedy,
the billionaire heir and Chairman of Cox Media, 15 obstructed public access
to the Ruby River from the Seyler Lane Bridge and the Lewis Lane Bridge. 16
Kennedy argued that the public had no right to access the river at all. He
asserted that, in light of the PPL Montana opinion, the Montana Supreme
Court had wrongly “transformed the public trust doctrine from a shield
protecting public land from alienation into a sword through which the State
can take a few citizens’ private property rights for public use.” 17 In essence,

10.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 24.

11.

Id. at 27.

12.

PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1234.

13.

Id. at 1235.

14.
2014).

Public Lands Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 321 P.3d 38 (Mont.

15. Profile of Jim Kennedy in The Richest People in America List, FORBES.COM,
http://www.forbes.com/profile/jim-kennedy (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
16.

Public Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 40-41.

17. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant James C. Kennedy at 39-41, Public
Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d 38 (No. 12-0312) (“Under the public trust doctrine and the
1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use
may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability
for nonrecreational purposes.”) (criticizing Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran,
682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984)); cf. Stephen D. Osborne et al., Laws Governing
71

West

Northwest, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 2015

Mr. Kennedy reasoned that since federal law determines title to the
underlying streambed, the state could not use the public trust doctrine to
infringe on that title.
Each side of the Montana public access and private property rights
debate thought PPL Montana supported their position. James Huffman,
former dean of the Lewis & Clark Law School, said that PPL Montana was a
“judicial smackdown . . . [that] called into question the legal underpinnings
of Montana’s 30-year-old stream-access law.” 18 The import of the decision,
in Huffman’s view, is that, under the equal footing doctrine, the title does
not belong to the state and the state cannot “enlarge what it got at
statehood, i.e., the beds of navigable rivers only.” 19 Huffman believes the
Supreme Court’s PPL Montana decision is a warning to the State that
“[c]laiming more would result in the expropriation of long vested privateproperty rights.” 20 By contrast, Jack Tuholske, a professor at Vermont Law
School, and Bruce Farling, the executive director of Montana Trout
Unlimited, reasoned that PPL Montana leaves states to define the scope of
the public trust doctrine “free from interference by the federal
government.” 21
To some degree, the “public trust doctrine” and the “equal footing
doctrine” obfuscate a simple underlying legal question: What are the public
and private property interests in any given body of water? Does, for
example, an owners’ title to submerged land include the right to exclude the
public from the water? Does the public’s interest in the water include a right
Recreational Access to Waters of the Columbia Basin: A Survey and Analysis, 33 ENVTL. L. 399,
413 (2003) (concluding from a survey of how the public trust doctrine is applied to
access rights in other Columbia River Basin states that “[w]hatever its scope in a
particular state, the public trust doctrine can protect water bodies from significant
impairments, thus providing a measure of protection for recreational uses”).
18. James Huffman, Op-Ed, Is Stream-Access Law on the Way Out?, DAILY INTER
LAKE
(May
25,
2013,
10:00
PM),
http://www.dailyinterlake.com/
opinion/article_a9f9e404-c5a6-11e2-ba39-0019bb2963f4.html.
19.

Id.

20. Id. It may be worth noting that PPL Montana, in its brief to the Supreme
Court, denied that the PPL Montana case would have any impact on public access and
use rights in privately owned waters. See Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 7, at 3
(“Montana’s invocations of sovereignty, the public trust, and the mystical qualities of
Montana and its trout streams do nothing to justify its massive land grab. This case
is not about ‘the paramount right of public use’ of rivers. . . . The relevant river
segments have long been and will continue to be open for fishing, recreational
pursuits, and other beneficial uses.”).
21. Jack Tuholske & Bruce Farling, Op-Ed, Stream Access Law Protective, Honorable,
MONT. STANDARD (June 12, 2013), http://mtstandard.com/news/opinion/Stream-accesslaw-protective-honorable/article_d1d6b3d4-d30d-11e2-89ce-001a4bcf887a.html.
72
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to incidental contact with the underlying land? 22 There is a wide range of
possible answers—Mr. Kennedy claimed that “title to the streambed
entailed the right to control access to fish, wade or boat on the waters
above . . . .” 23 On the other extreme, title to the submerged land may give
the private owner neither the right to exclude the public from traveling along
the bed and banks or from fishing in the water (as is the case in Montana
and many other states). 24
The problem with the Supreme Court’s
formulation in PPL Montana is that it suggests under these two doctrines
both the state courts and the federal courts have say in the matter. As a
consequence, PPL Montana provides no instruction as to whether these
questions should be answered by reference to state or federal law.
In January 2014, the Montana State Supreme Court rejected Mr.
Kennedy’s challenge to public use rights, 25 finding that the public use right
“is not a property right, or an interest in the landowners’ . . . Rather, it
amounts to a recognition of the physical reality that in order for the public
to recreationally use its water resource, some ‘minimal’ contact with the
banks and beds of rivers is generally necessary.” 26 Further, “[t]hat use does
not amount to an easement or any other ‘interest’ in land” and therefore
cannot constitute a taking. 27 In other words, the Montana Supreme Court
attempted to define public rights grounded in the state’s public trust
doctrine as something other than interests in property. At least one elected
official has called for the case to be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 28

22. See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont.
1984) (suggesting that the public trust doctrine is applicable to surface waters
because the State owned the water under the Constitution and the Constitution and
the public trust doctrine establish public use rights); cf. Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595
S.W.2d. 659, 665 (Ark. 1980) (finding public use rights in surface waters in a common
law riparian regime).
23.

Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant James C. Kennedy, supra note 17, at

24.

See id. at 38–40.

43.
25. Public Lands Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 321 P.3d 38, 50
(Mont. 2014).
26.

Id. at 52 (citation omitted).

27.

Id. at 53.

28. Debby Barrett, Stream Access Decision Sets New, Negative Precedent for Montana
Landowners,
NW.
MONT.
NEWS
SOURCE
ONLINE,
(Jan.
21,
2014,
10:25 AM), http://www.flatheadnewsgroup.com/hungryhorsenews/article_9e753af082b8-11e3-9fd2-0019bb2963f4.html (“The Montana Supreme Court has had a run of
bad luck in their decisions being challenged at the federal level lately. The
aforementioned unanimous overturning of their decision in the PPL case . . . and
another unanimous overturning of their ruling on Montana’s campaign finance law,
73
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This could be a tempting test case for a Supreme Court willing to recognize a
judicial taking because the taking would be affected not by a state supreme
court changing its state laws of property, but rather by a state supreme court
contravening a federal concept of property found in the “equal footing
doctrine.” 29
The equal-footing and the public trust doctrines have sparked
extensive scholarship devoted to the doctrines’ legal history 30 and common
parentage. 31 It is reasonable to speculate that some of the scholarship aims
to prove the superiority of one doctrine or the infirmity of the other. 32 The
public trust doctrine, which evolved—controversially to some—from a
presumption against alienation of public property to obligations on states
to manage and protect public resources, has garnered more attention than
battles over streambed title. 33 Perhaps thoroughly discrediting one of the
two doctrines would resolve the riddle posed by the PPL Montana case. On
the other hand, as was proposed, the doctrines themselves may be red
herrings. The legal question is whether state or federal law should
determine the extent of public and private property interests in bodies of
water and the land beneath them. By focusing on the federal and state case
law, this article explains how courts have addressed that question long
before either “public trust” or “equal footing” became principles of American
law.
Under English common law—or at least as the law stood at the time of
the American Revolution—the Crown enjoyed presumptive title to lands
underlying navigable waters, which included the sea and all waters subject

indicate[s] a problem with [their] interpretation of constitutional rights. This case
may move their already-poor record to 0 for 3.”).
29. See Josh Patashnik, Bringing a Judicial Takings Claim, 64 STAN. L. REV. 255, 260
(2012) (noting that Stop the Beach Renourishment, a 2010 Supreme Court decision,
“seems to offer a promising avenue of relief for a property owner who believes that a
judicial opinion has changed the law in a way that deprives her of a property right
she formerly held”); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010)).
30. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 715 (1986);
Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and State
Jurisprudence, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557, 563–66 (1995).
31. James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and
Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997).
32. See James Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 351 (1998).
74
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to the ebb and flow of the tide (the sea and its arms). 34 By contrast, the title
of each riparian landowner adjacent to nonnavigable waters extended to the
center of the river or stream—ad filum aquae. 35 Although American states
incorporated the English common law into their judicial canons, 36 many
states found the tidal definition of navigable waters unsuited for their
unique geography and accordingly invented new definitions of “navigable”
that expanded state title to submerged lands. At the same time state courts
were redefining “navigable waters” for purposes of title, federal courts were
wrestling with the question of what constituted “navigable waters” for
purposes of admiralty jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 37
Eventually the federal courts rejected the English rule, extending admiralty
jurisdiction to all waters that were “navigable in fact.” 38 The definition of
navigable waters as applied by states to determine title to submerged lands
was not synonymous with the federal definition for purposes of Article III
jurisdiction. 39 Some states in fact retained the English rule, limiting state
ownership of submerged lands to waters subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide, while other states defined navigable waters more broadly than the
federal courts. 40
This distinction between federal and state law survived—both in the
federal and state courts—for well over a century. It wasn’t until the 1920s
that the federal courts decided that the equal footing doctrine made
“navigable waters” for purposes of title a federal, as opposed to state law,
question. 41 In the aftermath of this transformation, state courts continued
to assert public rights in waters that failed the federal definition of

34.
35.
(1836).

Rasband, supra note 31, at 9–11.
S. F. D., Codification and Reform of the Law-No. III, 16 AM. JURIST & L. MAG.59, 69

36. Kathleen Keffer, Choosing a Law to Live by Once the King Is Gone, 24 REGENT U.
L. REV. 147, 157–59 (2011).
37.

See infra Part III.

38. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870) (overruling The Steamboat Thomas
Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1851)).
39. Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); see infra text accompanying
notes 125–30.
40. S. F. D., supra note 35, at 70. The authors of Codification and Reform of the Law
in 1836 noted that “whatever opinion may be entertained on this point, no one would
contend, that a distinction should exist, between proprietors above, and those
below, the uncertain line, where the tide ceases to ebb and flow, merely because of
that circumstance.” Id.
41. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); see infra text
accompanying notes 175–84.
75
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“navigable” by adopting a different question of “navigable” for public use. 42
By expanding definitions of navigable waters for use (as opposed to title)
and by recognizing the right of the public to incidental contact with the
submerged lands of “navigable” waters, some states have managed to
provide the public with use rights similar to what the public would have with
title to the submerged land. 43 The “public trust” doctrine is one tool state
courts have relied on in their efforts to expand public rights in private
waters. 44 This article explains how federal and state court precedents have
led to the present day impasse of the PPL Montana case and exposes some
underlying legal myths that helped to usher us into this predicament.

II. The English Common Law in Early American Courts
Mr. Carson must have been a bit upset when, on April 10th, 1803, a
man “trod down his grass,” entered the fishery adjacent to the 228 acres he
owned along the Susquehanna River, and proceeded to haul off with a
thousand fish. 45 Under the English common law rule, if a river was not
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, it was not navigable. 46 As a
consequence, title of the riparian landowner—and the exclusive right of
fishery—extended to the middle of the river, ad filum medium aquae. 47 The
plaintiff insisted on this point, arguing that “there is no flow and reflow of
the tide . . . therefore, although navigated by boats of a certain
description . . . [the Susquehanna] does not come within the legal definition
of a navigable river.” 48 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, rejected
the English rule as “highly unreasonable when applied to [Pennsylvania’s]
large rivers.” 49 Chief Justice Tilghman concluded that “the owner of land on
the banks of the Susquehanna, has no exclusive right to fish in the river
immediately in front of his lands, but that right to fisheries in that river is

42. See infra Part VI.A (discussing Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849) and
Shaw v. Oswego, 10 Or. 371 (1882)).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 239–45 (discussing Arkansas v. McIlroy,
595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980)).
44.

See infra Part VI.B.

45. Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 475 (Pa. 1810). The fish taken were American
shad, id., which return upstream each spring to their birthplace to spawn. Rich
Remer, Fishtown and the Shad Fisheries, PA. LEGACIES, Nov. 2002, at 20, 20. Thus the
fishery constructed by Mr. Carson’s brother was presumably the birthplace for the
shad taken by Mr. Blazer. Carson, 2 Binn. at 477.

76
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Rasband, supra note 31, at 9–11.

47.

Carson, 2 Binn. at 483–84.

48.

Id. at 479.

49.

Id. at 478.
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vested in the state, and open to all.” 50 Pennsylvania was perhaps the first
state to openly question the adequacy of the English “ebb and flow”
standard for navigable waters in the United States, but other states shortly
followed with their own consideration—and often rejection—of the English
rule. 51

A. New Jersey Before and After Martin v. Lessee of Waddell
To address whether federal or state law determines the definition of
“navigable waters” for the purpose of title, New Jersey offers important cases
for consideration. In two cases, forty-six years apart, the New Jersey
Supreme Court remained steadfast in its conviction that defining navigable
waters for purposes of title was fundamentally a state law question. In
between these two New Jersey cases, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Martin
v. Lessee of Waddell, a case cited by Justice Kennedy in PPL Montana as
fundamental in establishing a federal definition of navigable waters for
purposes of title. 52 The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decisions—one
preceding and one following Martin—demonstrate state resistance to the
imposition of a federal definition for waters which the states had
traditionally defined. 53

50.

Carson, 2 Binn. at 495.

51. See, e.g., Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day 22, 25–26 (Conn. 1811) (rejecting a call for
“any train of reasoning as to what is most or least reasonable” and accepting the
English common law rule); Cates’ Ex’rs v. Wadlington, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 580, 580
(1822) (finding no “legislative act declaring which, or whether any of our rivers are to
be considered as public or navigable rivers,” but still rejecting the English common
law rule “in this state, where our rivers are navigable several hundred miles above the
flowing tide.”); Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30, 34–35 (1828) (dismissing the
English common law rule as “entirely inapplicable to [North Carolina’s] situation,
arising both from the great length of our rivers, extending far in the interior, and the
sand-bars and other obstructions at their mouths.”).
52. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S.Ct 1215, 1227 (2012); see Jas. Jeffrey
Adams & Cody Winterton, Navigability in Oregon: Between a River Rock and a Hard Place, 41
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 615, 620 n.28 (2005) (“[Martin v. Waddell] is central to the equal
footing doctrine. The court stated the rule controlling ownership of shorelines, beds
and banks of navigable-for-title watercourses in relation to the original 13 states.”).
Other scholars also identify Martin as an important step in the development of a
federal definition of navigable waters. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois
Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 828 (2004).
53. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 1 (1821); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 371–
72 (1867).
77
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The first New Jersey case, Arnold v. Mundy, decided twenty-one years
before Martin, confirmed the English common law definition of navigable
and, more interestingly, planted the seed of what would become the public
trust doctrine years later. 54 In Arnold, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
“enter[ed] upon the plaintiff’s oyster bed” and carried off with his oysters. 55
Whether the plaintiff had exclusive possession to the submerged lands
hinged on whether the title to the adjacent land, which could be traced back
to a grant conveyed by King Charles II, did (or even could) include title to
the underlying bed. 56 Chief Justice Kirpatrick’s majority opinion included
two essential findings: first, it affirmed the English rule that title to
submerged lands of tidal waters was presumptively owned by the sovereign 57
and second, it found that the sovereign could not have conveyed that title. 58
In oft-quoted language, Kirkpatrick proclaimed:
I say I am of opinion, that by all these, the navigable rivers in
which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of
the sea, including both the water and the land under the water,
for the purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing,
fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of the water and its
products (a few things excepted) are common to all the
citizens . . . ; that the property, indeed, strictly speaking, is vested
in the sovereign, but it is vested in him not for his own use, but
the for the use of the citizen, that is, for his direct and immediate
enjoyment. 59
The first finding of his decision—that the sovereign holds presumptive
title to the land underlying navigable water—is simply a restatement of the
English common law rule. The second finding of Justice Kirkpatrick’s
decision—that the lands beneath navigable waters could not be conveyed
into private ownership—became the fundamental tenet of the public trust

54.

Arnold, 6 N.J.L at 10–12.

55.

Id. at 9.

56.

Huffman, supra note 32, at 37–39.

57. Arnold, 6 N.J.L at 10. (“[A] grant of land to a subject or citizen, bounded
upon a fresh water stream or river, where the tide neither ebbs nor flows, extends to
the middle of the channel of such river; but that a grant bounded upon a navigable
river, or other water, where the tide does ebb or flow, extends to the edge of the
water only, that is to say, to high water mark, when the tide is high, and to low water
mark, when the tide is low, but it extends no farther. . . . All pretence of claim,
therefore, to this bed, founded upon the possession of the adjacent land, must fail.”).

78

58.

Id. at 11–12; see also, e.g., Huffman, supra note 32, at 38.

59.

Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 11–12.
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doctrine. 60 It is important to note that the oyster beds at issue in Arnold were
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; therefore, there was no real question
as to whether the oyster beds were, according to the English common law
definition, navigable waters. The only real dispute in Arnold was whether the
sovereign—the state or the Crown—could convey title to navigable waters.
Shortly after Arnold, New Jersey passed a statute allowing landowners
of tidal-influenced riparian land to lease portions of the adjacent submerged
land from the state for use as private oyster beds. 61 In Martin v. Lessee of
Waddell, the plaintiff had complied with the statute and sought to eject the
defendant, who claimed to have a superior title to the submerged lands
granted by King Charles II. 62 To reconcile these facts, the U.S. Supreme
Court reviewed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Arnold—that the
Crown could not convey submerged lands. 63 The plaintiff argued that
“[p]rivate rivers are presumed to be owned by the adjacent proprietors. Not
so with public rivers; they are, at common law, in the king.” 64 Thus, the
Crown could not have transferred the seabed into private ownership. 65
Directly noting that the case required passing judgment on the Arnold
decision, 66 the plaintiff asserted that the issue was solely a matter of state
law and that the federal courts, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, must decide
the matter consistent with the state law: “[I]t is state law [the federal courts]
are to apply, not to review, alter or remodel . . . . The federal courts follow,
and do not lead; their jurisdiction is occasional. Perhaps, not one part in
ten thousand of the public waters in question, are under the jurisdiction of
this court at all.” 67 Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority, determined
that the decision rested not on state law or federal law but rather English
law. The essential issue was whether the Crown’s title to the navigable
waters, and the soils under them, “were intended to be a trust for the
common use . . . or private property to be parceled out and sold to
individuals . . . .” 68 The Court reasoned that this inquiry would require
consideration of “[t]he laws and institutions of England, the history of the
times, the object of the charter, the contemporaneous construction given to
it, and the usages under it, for the century or more which has since

60. See BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND
ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY 45–57 (1998).
61.

Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 379 (1842).

62.

Id. at 378–80.

63.

Huffman, supra note 32, at 44.

64.

Martin, 41 U.S. at 383.

65.

Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 4 (1821).

66.

Martin, 41 U.S. at 389.

67.

Id. at 389–90.

68.

Id. at 411.
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elapsed.” 69 From these sources, the Court found that “the shores, and rivers
and bays and arms of the sea, and the land under them [were] held as a
public trust for the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all
for navigation and fishery.” 70 Additionally, the Court acknowledged in dicta
that it was universal throughout the colonies to “enjoy in common, the
benefits and advantages of the navigable waters, for the same purposes, and
to the same extent, that they have been used and enjoyed, for centuries, in
England.” 71
At the time of the Martin decision, many states had considered and
expanded by judicial opinion the English doctrine for determining title to
submerged lands. 72 These states had treated the issue of what was
“navigable” for purposes of title as a state law issue. 73 Martin was a
departure from this only in the sense that it was a decision by the Supreme
Court. Therefore, the emphasis, should be placed on the fact that the Court
addressed whether the crown could convey title in trust lands. In rejecting
the view that this was a matter of state law, the Supreme Court, if anything,
was suggesting that the trust doctrine—not the definition of navigable
waters—was a federal law question. 74
Importantly, the Court decided Martin by reference to English common
law—not the law as it was evolving in the states. If determining title for a
conveyance from the Crown prior to a state’s succession as sovereign
requires application of the common law of England, conveyances made by
the federal government prior to the admission of a state to the union might
require application of some Federal common law. It is worth noting that
many states that were not one of the original thirteen colonies redefined
navigable waters as a matter of state law, such as Tennessee in 1845, 75 Iowa
in 1856, 76 and Minnesota in 1893 77 and these decisions effected proprietors
who had obtained grants of land from the federal government prior to

69.

Martin, 41 U.S. at 411.

70.

Id. at 413.

71.

Id. at 414.

72.

S. F. D., supra note 35, at 70.

73.

Id.

74. See Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV.
6, 6 (1910) (noting that at least for some period of time, “the common law” was
thought to be universal and was assumed to be “or ought to be the same in all the
states where the common law is supposed to prevail”); cf. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S.
371, 381–84 (1891) (discussing the relationship between state, federal, and common
law).
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Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 358 (1845).
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McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Clarke 1 (Iowa 1856).

77.

Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.1893).
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statehood. Thus, state courts continued immediately and long after Martin
to treat the definition of navigable waters as a matter of state law without
reference to either English or Federal common law.
Three years after Martin, the Supreme Court decided Pollard v. Hagan, 78
another case in the narrative of establishing a federal definition of navigable
waters for purposes of title. 79 Pollard arose from facts quite similar to those
in Martin, except that Alabama, where the facts of Pollard took place, was
admitted to the Union after the original thirteen colonies. Therefore, while
Martin turned on English law because the title claim included a grant from
the Crown, the plaintiffs in Pollard claimed that the United States had
inherited its sovereignty over the territory that became Alabama from the
King of Spain. 80 Spain, being a civil law country, did not adhere to the same
“public trust” doctrine under common law followed by the Court in Martin. 81
The plaintiff reasoned that the United States government had the sovereign
capacity, just as the King of Spain had, “to grant to a subject the soil under
navigable waters.” 82 Evoking the equal footing language, the Supreme Court
held that Alabama must be accepted to the Union with the same
“sovereignty and jurisdiction” of the states preceding it. 83 “To maintain any
other doctrine,” the Court reasoned, “is to deny that Alabama has been
admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original states.” 84
The ensuing question, of course, is what should be considered as
governing the “sovereignty and jurisdiction” provided under equal footing?
The Court determined this to be the English common law “as modified by
our own institutions.” 85 The most literal reading might be that this rejected
the English common law rule in favor of the developing (but not uniform)
rule of navigable waters in the American states. However, since the
submerged land in question was not outside the scope of the English
common law, another explanation may be offered for the “modification”
recognized by the Supreme Court. In this instance, the Court seems to have
been concerned with what the state could or could not do with the
submerged lands of navigable waters. In rebuking the claim that the federal
government could convey submerged land prior to admitting a state to the
Union, the Court proclaimed:

78.

Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).

79. Robert Barrett, History of an Equal Footing: Ownership of the Western Federal
Lands, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 761, 783–84 (1997).
80.

Pollard, 44 U.S. at 225.

81.

Id. at 228–29.

82.
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83.
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Id. at 229.

85.

Id.
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This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under
the navigable waters, for all municipal purposes, belongs
exclusively to the states within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, and they, and they only, have the constitutional
power to exercise it. To give to the United States the right to
transfer to a citizen the title to the shores and the soils under the
navigable waters, would be placing in their hands
a
weapon
which might be wielded greatly to the injury of state sovereignty,
and deprive the states of the power to exercise a numerous and
important class of police powers. 86
Perhaps no more persuasive proof that the Martin decision was not
meant to displace state sovereignty over which waters are public can be
offered than by reference to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1867 opinion in
Cobb v. Davenport, which clearly reiterated that the issue was a matter for the
state to decide. 87 The Cobb opinion also made clear, if it was not done so in
Arnold, that New Jersey was satisfied to adopt the limited English rule. 88 The
plaintiff in Cobb asserted an exclusive right to fish on Green Pond based on
the English common law definition of “navigable waters” 89 but also
acknowledged that “[t]here are American cases to the contrary . . . which go
upon the grounds that the beds of the large navigable rivers were never
granted to the riparian owners.” 90 The defendant, on the other hand, argued
for a navigability-in-fact standard: “Are the waters actually navigable? That is
the practical test. The tidal test contains no principle, and has not been
adopted here as part of the common law.” 91 Pointing out that Green Pond
was “a natural lake, three miles long and nearly one mile wide,” the
defendant’s counsel argued that it should be treated as an inland sea,
subject to the same principles that determined that the submerged land
belonged to the state in Arnold and Martin. 92 The New Jersey Supreme Court,
however, found “nothing in topography or location [of New Jersey] that
requires a departure from the rules of the common law,” and declined to
expand the English definition of navigable waters beyond those subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide. 93 The court preferred the English rule, which
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Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 383–84 (N.J. 1867).
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Id. at 370.
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Id. at 374 (emphasis in original).
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Id. at 374.
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Cobb, 32 N.J.L. at 380.
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was uniform and clear, over the navigable-in-fact standard, which the court
found “wanting in that accuracy and certainty at which the law aims.” 94

B. Other State Law Decisions after Martin and Pollard v.
Hagan
After Martin, other state courts continued to define navigable waters
for purposes of title under state law. Only three years after the Martin
decision, Tennessee adopted the broader definition of “navigable” for
purposes of title. 95 The Supreme Court of Tennessee contrasted the
common law of Great Britain, based in part on “[t]he insular position of
Great Britain, the short courses of her rivers, and the well-known fact there
are none of them navigable above tide-water but for very small craft” with
the civil law of continental Europe, which provides that “all rivers, even
above tide-water, provided are navigable for shops or boats, are considered
as public property.” 96 Considering the geography of Tennessee, the court
concluded that “to adopt the English principle . . . would be . . . an absurdity
too monstrous to be thought of.” 97 Furthermore, the court found that
Tennessee had no obligation to adopt the English rule because the State
had not incorporated those parts of English common law that were
“repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this
State, and the frame of government therein established.” 98 Since the English
common law rule for navigability was “so obviously at war with the position
of our country and its best interests,” the court concluded that the English
rule “had never been in force and use in [Tennessee].” 99
One of the last state court opinions defining “navigability” for
purposes of title comes from Minnesota in 1893. 100 Lamprey v. Metcalf is an
impressive opinion that deserves to be discussed at length, not only
because the Supreme Court of Montana cited it nearly a century later, 101 but
also because of the clarity with which it handles the question of public
versus private ownership. The dispute in Lamprey concerned the title to dry
land that had been submerged beneath a nonnavigable lake at the time of
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Cobb, 32 N.J.L. at 379–80.

95.

Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tenn. 358, 359–62 (1845).

96.

Id. at 366.

97.
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Id. at 367
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Id. at 367–68.
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Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.1893).

101. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 169 (Mont. 1984)
(quoting Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143).
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conveyance by the federal government prior to Minnesota’s statehood. 102
The riparian owners asserted title against objection by the State, which
claimed that “the former bed of the lake belongs to the state, in its sovereign
capacity.” 103 The court considered two issues: first, whether the riparian
owner had title to the bed before the lake dried up and, second, if not,
whether the riparian gained title to the dry land as the lake disappeared. 104
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that, although it may have
previously thought that federal law would control the issue, the United
States Supreme Court had not explicitly adopted such a stance. 105 Thus, the
Court concluded that “whether the land forming the beds of these lakes
belongs to the state, or to the owners of the riparian lands, is a question to
be determined entirely by the laws of Minnesota.” 106
Just like the Supreme Court of Tennessee a half-century prior and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania almost a century earlier, the Minnesota
Supreme Court began its analysis with consideration of the English rule. 107
And just as those courts that had considered the English rule as ill-fit to
their geography, the Minnesota court compared itself favorably to England,
where “there are but few lakes.” 108 The court also differentiated itself from
the English rule temporally, noting that:
In early times, about the only use—except, perhaps, fishing—to
which the people of England had occasion to put public waters,
and about the only use to which such waters were adapted, was
navigation, and the only waters suited to that purpose were
those in which the tide ebbed and flowed. 109
After considering the policy merits of public versus private ownership
of lake beds, the court framed the question in a broader way than earlier
state court decisions: “The division of waters into navigable and
nonnavigable is but a way of dividing them into public and private waters . . .
the line of division being largely determined by its conditions and habits.” 110

102.

Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1140.

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105. Id. at 1141 (“We therefore approach the question in this case
untrammeled by the binding authority of any federal decisions, or even by any direct
decisions in this state, in which this is still an open question.”)
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“But,” the court posed, “if, under present conditions of society, bodies of
water are used for public uses other than mere commercial navigation, in its
ordinary sense, we fail to see why they ought not to be held to be public
waters, or navigable waters, if the old nomenclature is preferred.” 111 After
contemplating the myriad different interests and uses the public might have
over time, the court stated that “[t]o hand over all these lakes to private
ownership, under any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a great
wrong upon the public for all time” 112 Thus, the court adopted a rule that
reflected the public uses at the time: “[S]o long as these lakes are capable of
use for boating, even for pleasure, they are navigable, within the spirit of the
common-law rule.” 113 This definition of navigable would eventually be
referred to as the “recreational use” test, later adopted by many states
seeking to protect public use of state waters as well as states protecting
public use of beaches. 114

III. The Development of a Federal Definition of Navigable
Waters for Purposes of Admiralty Jurisdiction
What can be said with confidence after reviewing the state law cases—
but is perhaps underappreciated—is that for more than the first century of
American history, states, as sovereigns, freely modified the common law rule
regarding public waters as they saw fit for their circumstance. But federal
courts at this time were concerned with the definition of navigable waters for
a very different purpose—to determine the admiralty jurisdiction of the
courts under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. 115
In an 1825 case, The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 116 the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that admiralty jurisdiction would be limited to navigable waters as
defined by the “ebb and flow” rule of English common law. 117 The dispute in
The Thomas Jefferson arose far inland on the Missouri River, in an area not
subject to the tide, and, as a result, the Court ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction to consider the case. 118 In 1845, Congress enacted legislation
extending the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts to the Great

111.

Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143.

112.

Id.

113.

Id. at 1144.

114. See infra notes 239–45 (discussing Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. 659
(Ark. 1980)).
115.

See The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 430 (1851).

116.

Id.

117. Mary Garvey Algero, Ebb and Flow of the Tide: A Viable Doctrine for Determining
Admiralty Jurisdiction or a Relic of the Past?, 1 LOY. MAR. L.J. 47, 50–51 (2002).
118.
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Lakes. 119 That legislation was challenged as being beyond the constitutional
limit of admiralty jurisdiction in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh. 120
Perhaps recognizing the error of applying a tidal limit in an increasingly
inland nation, the Court upheld the statute and overturned its decision in
The Thomas Jefferson. 121 The Court surmised:
It is evident that a definition that would at this day limit public
rivers in this country to tidewater rivers is utterly inadmissible.
We have thousands of miles of public navigable water, including
lakes and rivers in which there is no tide. And certainly there can
be no reason for admiralty power over a public tidewater, which
does not apply with equal force to any other public water used
for commercial purposes and foreign trade. 122
Extension of admiralty jurisdiction eventually evolved into what has
become known as the “navigable in fact” standard. In The Daniel Ball, 123 an
1870 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that federal admiralty
jurisdiction extended to all waters that are navigable in fact and “they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in
their ordinary condition, as highway for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water.” 124 It is clear from the opinion in The Daniel Ball that navigable
waters for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction remained a separate question
from navigable waters for purposes of title to submerged lands, as defined
by the states.
Barney v. City of Keokuk, 125 which followed The Daniel Ball by only six years,
further eliminated any confusion between the state law definitions of
navigable for purposes of title and the definition of navigable for purposes
of admiralty jurisdiction. In Barney, the City of Keokuk had extended the
shore of the Mississippi River by about two hundred feet to build a railroad.
The railroad line, however cut off the homeowner on Water Street from
access to the river. No doubt upset about this, the homeowner argued that
title to the artificially reclaimed portion of the River was his as the
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riparian. 126 In a paragraph too long to cite in full, but worth parsing
carefully, the Court began by noting that artificially reclaimed portions of
navigable waters, under the English common law rule, belonged to the
crown. 127 The Court then pointed out that “the only waters recognized in
England as navigable were tide-waters,” and lamented that the:
[C]onfusion of navigable with tide water . . . had the influence for
two generations of excluding the admiralty jurisdiction from our
great rivers and inland seas; and under the like influence it laid
the foundation in many States of doctrines with regard to the
ownership of navigable waters above tide-water at variance with
sound principles of public policy. 128
Clearly, the Court differentiates between “navigable” as it relates to
admiralty jurisdiction and “navigable” as it relates to ownership. Further, it
notes that ownership of navigable waters is decided by state law. 129 If there
is any doubt, the Court went on to say that the question of title to
submerged lands “properly belongs to the States by their inherent
sovereignty, and the United States has wisely abstained from extending (if it
could extend) its survey and grants beyond the limits of high water.” 130

IV. The Continued Reliance on State Law Definitions of
Navigable Waters for Purposes of Title
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and state courts accepted this distinction
between navigable waters for federal admiralty jurisdiction (a question of
federal law) and navigable waters for purposes of title (a state law question)
well into the 20th Century with one exception—Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Illinois. 131 In light of the Court’s prior decision in Hardin v. Jordan 132 and the
Court’s subsequent decisions, 133 Illinois Central was clearly an exception to the
well-established rule for a single reason: The dispute involved title to one of
the Great Lakes—America’s inland seas.
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A. The Great Inland Seas Exception: Hardin and Illinois
Central
Considering that Illinois Central has become a rather infamous case in
American legal discourse, 134 it is surprising how little attention is given to
Hardin. 135 But Hardin shows that the Supreme Court in Illinois Central was not
creating a new federal rule to determine title to all submerged lands.
Rather, Hardin makes clear that the Supreme Court in Illinois Central treated
the Great Lakes as an exception to the general rule that title to submerged
lands is a question of state law.
Hardin did not in fact involve a dispute over the Great Lakes, but rather
involved a title dispute for a relatively small lake. 136 The Court affirmed that
the question of title to submerged lands “depends on the law of each state”
and proceeded to decide the case exclusively under Illinois state law. 137
Noting that “some of the states” had extended the English rule to navigable
rivers, the Court observed that Illinois had adhered to the narrower English
rule “that the beds of all streams above the flow of the tide, whether actually
navigable or not, belong to the proprietors of the adjoining lands.” 138 The
Court added that these “observations do not apply to our great navigable
lakes, which are really inland seas.” 139 The conclusion of Hardin was that
since Illinois adhered to the common law rule (and had not expanded the
definition of navigable waters above the tide), the lake in questions
belonged to the riparian owners and not the state. 140

134.

See, e.g., Grant, supra note 132, at 868–69.

135. Hardin is referenced, if at all, only for the premise that the Great Lakes
should be treated like seas for purposes of the public trust doctrine. See, e.g.,
Kenneth K. Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Shores, 58 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 27 (2010).
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Hardin, 140 U.S. at 372.

137. Id. at 382; see Janice Lawrence, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of the
Public Trust, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1138, 1141 (1982) (suggesting that the Court’s choice of
state law undermines the concept of a Federal public trust doctrine, not the validity
of the equal footing doctrine).
138.

Hardin, 140 U.S. at 383 (citing Beckman v. Kreamer, 43 Ill. 447 (1867)).

139.

Id. at 391.

140. Id. at 397. After first pronouncing this a matter of state law, the Court
found that Illinois adhered to the common law and, not finding persuasive precedent
in Illinois state law otherwise, asserted that the Supreme Court is “not without
express authority, in addition to that of Lord Coke, as to the rule of the common
law.” Id. at 391.
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Illinois Central, by contrast, was a dispute over title to the submerged
lands of Lake Michigan along the shore of Chicago. 141 The State of Illinois
had conveyed title of the submerged portion of Lake Michigan to the Illinois
Central Railroad Company in 1870 and repealed the conveyance three years
later. 142 When the railroad company refused to quit the submerged lands,
the Attorney General brought suit seeking to quiet title in the state. 143 The
Court began its opinion by noting that when Illinois entered the United
States in 1818, it had done so “on an equal footing with the original
states . . . [with] no distinction between the several states of the Union in
the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may
possess and exercise” 144 Further, the Court noted, “[i]t is the settled law of
this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands
covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several states, belong to the
respective states within which they are found.” 145 The Court, without any
reference to the state law of Illinois, went on to reject the tidal ebb and flow
limits of the English common law, noting that this doctrine “is now
repudiated in this country as wholly inapplicable to our condition.” 146 This
would be a sudden departure from the holding in Hardin, except that the
Supreme Court in Hardin made clear that the Great Lakes present an
exceptional case. Hardin and Illinois read together hold that while states may
generally define navigability for purposes of title, this prerogative does not
apply to the Great Lakes—America’s “inland seas.” 147

B. After Illinois Central: Shively v. Bowlby and Donnelly v.
United States
The issue of title to submerged lands came before the Supreme Court
again only two years after Illinois Central in Shively v. Bowlby, 148 a dispute over
title to the tidal lands below the high-water mark of the Columbia River in
Oregon. In this case, the Court directly confronted the issue of how
conveyances made prior to statehood should be treated, 149 but it cannot be
said that this was a novel problem. Hardin, in fact, was a dispute over a
conveyance made by the federal government in which “all the justices
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Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 433–34 (1892).
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agreed that the question must be determined by the law of Illinois.” 150 Also,
as noted, the Lamprey opinion involved a conveyance made prior to
statehood. 151 The Shively opinion provides an incredibly thorough review of
both federal and state court treatment of navigable waters. Although the
Court affirmed Oregon’s sovereignty over the matter, the decision was not
difficult in part because the controversy was over tidal waters. Even still, the
Court made sure to reference the law of Oregon regarding title to submerged
lands in its opinion. 152 There could be little doubt at the end of the 19th
century that states enjoyed the right and responsibility as sovereigns to
determine, within their own borders, what bodies of water would be
considered navigable and, consequently, whether the title to the submerged
lands of these waters rested with the public or private riparian proprietors.
No federal case is more cited by states in support of the proposition
that they “may adopt their own definitions of navigability” than Donnelly v.
United States. 153 And perhaps no other case in the lexicon of “navigable”
waters concerns murder. In a federal proceeding, Donnelly was indicted,
convicted of murder, and sentenced to life in prison for shooting a
Chickasaw Indian “in or near the edge of the water of the Klamath river” in
California. 154 Donnelly challenged the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 155 If
he was within the limits of the Extension of the Hoop Valley Reservation, he
was in the jurisdiction of the federal government. 156 If, on the other hand,
Donnelly was on state land, the federal court lacked jurisdiction to convict
him. 157 It seems accepted that Donnelly was “upon the Klamath river.” 158
The question then was whether the Klamath River was part of the
reservation or owned by the state. In deciding this question, the Court
noted that under the equal footing language articulated in Pollard, “the state
had the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over the navigable waters
as the original states . . . and that the title of the navigable waters, and the
soil beneath them, was in the state, and subject to its sovereignty and
jurisdiction.” Citing now familiar cases such as Barney, the Court concluded
that “what shall be deemed a navigable water within the meaning of the

150.

Shively, 152 U.S. at 45.

151. See supra text accompanying notes 102–03 (discussing Lamprey v. Metcalf,
53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.1893)).
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United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913)).
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local rules of property is for the determination of the several states.” 159
Examining the local law, the Court found that California had adopted the
English rule and that the “subsequent judicial history of the state” showed
that this “operated . . . as a transfer to all riparian proprietors, including the
United States, of the property of the state, if any she had, in the nonnavigable streams and the soil beneath them.” 160 Given the emphasis of the
Supreme Court that the “appropriate authorities of California” determine
title to the river, 161 it should not be surprising that Donnelly has been cited as
recently as 1980 for the right of states to determine “navigable waters.” 162

V. The Switch from a State to Federal Definition of
Navigable Waters for Purposes of Title
The phrase “equal footing” appears to have entered the American
lexicon through the Northwest Ordinance, the predecessor to which had
been drafted by Thomas Jefferson and reflected his desire that new states
“be politically equal to the original 13 states.” 163 The Supreme Court, in
Pollard, Shively, and several other cases related to the nature of sovereign
control of states over navigable waters invoked this language to support the
principle that each state inherited title to the submerged lands of navigable
waters upon entering the union. 164 To borrow the language from Illinois
Central: “The state of Illinois was admitted into the Union in 1818 on an
equal footing with the original states, in all respects . . . . There can be no
distinction between the several states of the Union in the character of the
jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may possess and
exercise over persons and subjects within their respective limits.” 165
This could be read to mean that the question of navigable waters for
purposes of title is a question of federal law. That conclusion not only runs
counter to the preceding history, which demonstrates that defining
“navigable” waters for purposes of title was a question of state law, but also
contradicts the holding in Hardin only a year prior to Illinois Central, wherein
the Court reaffirmed that the definition of “navigable” waters was essentially
a question of state law. A better explanation of the Supreme Court’s
159.

Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 262.

160.

Id. at 263–64.

161.

Id.

162. See infra text accompanying notes 230–38, 246–51 (discussing Day v.
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) and Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. 659 (Ark.
1980)).
163.

Rasband, supra note 31, at 32.

164. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 216 (1845); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 27 (1894).
165.

Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 434.
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reference to the equal footing doctrine in these early title cases is for the
more limited principle that each new state entered the union with nothing
less than the title to the submerged lands encompassed by the English rule.
That would explain at least Martin, Pollard, and Shively, since all three
concerned tidal waters. The odd case out appears to be Illinois Central, but as
also was shown in the prior discussion, U.S. courts treated the Great Lakes
as inland seas and, even if not subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, within
the spirit of the English rule. It seems noteworthy that not one case in the
first 150 years of the new American republic invoking the equal footing
language denied a state’s claim to title of submerged lands. A 1921 article
in the Harvard Law Review capably sums up the generally accepted position:
Whether ownership of riparian lands extends to the middle
thread, or stops with meander lines or with low-water lines, are
local questions determined by state law, which is binding on the
federal courts, even to the latest decision changing the local
rules. And this applies to claims of title under federal grants, and
to accretions and made land in national
streams
like
the
Mississippi. 166
A series of three cases from 1922 to 1931 changed the question of title
from local to federal law and should be recognized today as the actual
starting point of the “equal footing doctrine” as applied to questions of title.

A. The Brewer-Holt-Utah Trilogy
The first case in the trilogy, Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,
involved a dispute over title to the bed and banks of portions of the
Arkansas River. 167 The United States, acting as trustee for the Osage Tribe of

166. Merritt Starr, Navigable Waters of the United States—State and National Control,
35 HARV. L. REV. 154, 164 (1921). Starr also declared that:
The shores and beds of navigable waters in the original states were not
granted to the national government, but were reserved to the states. And
upon the admission of new states to the Union the beds of navigable
rivers within their boundaries passed to the states, so that they have the
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over the shores and beds as
have the original states. The status of this land is determined by the law
of each state.
Id. at 162. Starr could have meant by “status” either that the alienability of the land
(public trust doctrine) or the original title to the land (equal footing doctrine) is a
matter of state law. The phrase quoted in the text makes clear that, at least to the
latter point, Starr thought state law was controlling.
167.
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Indians, sought to enjoin the development of oil and gas leases granted by
the state of Oklahoma in portions of the river crossing the Osage
Reservation. 168 The state of Oklahoma, intervening on behalf of the lessees,
argued that the relevant portions of the Arkansas River were navigable under
state law and thus title to the submerged land rested with the state—not
the U.S. government. 169 The Court did not outright deny the state court
jurisdiction on the question of what constitutes navigable waters, but
instead determined that the state court’s opinion over navigable waters
could not be binding on the federal government, which had not been party
to the state court adjudication. 170 Referring to the Hardin decision, the Court
accepted that “[i]n government patents containing no words showing
purpose to define riparian rights, the intention to abide the state law is
inferred.” 171 The Court continued:
Some states have sought to retain title to the beds of streams by
recognizing them as navigable when they are not actually so. It
seems to be a convenient method of preserving their control. No
one can object to it unless it is sought thereby to conclude one
whose right to the bed of the river granted and vesting before
statehood, depends for its validity on nonnavigability of the
stream in fact. In such a case, navigability vel non is not a local
question. 172
In other words, the question of navigable waters for purposes of title is
generally a local one, but not in cases where the title being asserted was
granted prior to statehood. This principle is a little less controversial than
asserting that the question of navigable waters for purposes of title is always
a federal question (that comes later). But looking back at the preceding
history, it is fairly clear that the status of grants made prior to statehood
were determined by local law until Brewer-Elliott.
The Supreme Court in Brewer-Elliott declared that:
[I]t is not for a state by courts or legislature, in dealing with the
general subject of beds of streams to adopt a retroactive rule for
determining navigability which would destroy a title already
accrued under federal law and grant or would enlarge what

168.

Brewer-Elliott, 260 U.S. at 79.

169.

Id. at 87.

170.

Id. at 86.

171.

Id. at 89.

172.

Id.
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actually passed to the state, at the time of her admission, under
the constitutional rule of equality here invoked. 173
Taken literally, each state should have succeeded only to the navigable
waters defined by the English rule—as was the case in Martin. That holding,
however, would have radically upset the established law in many states.
Instead, the Supreme Court decided to use the navigable-in-fact rule, which
it had previously applied only in cases regarding the admiralty jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 174 Declaring navigable-in-fact as the proper rule for all
states would have upset the state court decisions that had rejected the
American rule in favor of the English rule such as New Jersey, Illinois and
Connecticut. How far-reaching the consequences of the Brewer-Elliott
decision might have been is not particularly clear. But the confusion would
not matter because four years later, the Supreme Court expanded the
applicability of the federal definition of navigable waters to all questions of
title.
Considering the clear articulation in favor of state sovereignty by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Lamprey, it may not be surprising that the
monumental turning point, Holt State Bank, 175 involved a dispute over title to
the bed and banks of a Minnesota lake. In 1926, the United States brought
suit to quiet title to the formerly submerged land of a lake, which the United
States claimed had not been navigable and therefore was part of an earlier
secession of land by the Chippewa tribe to the federal government. 176 In
deciding Holt State Bank, the Court affirmed two lower court opinions that
found the lake to be navigable. 177 He rejected, however, the lower courts
application of state law as opposed to federal law to reach that
conclusion. 178 In the case below, the Eighth Circuit had stated that “[i]t is
determined by the law of the state where . . . the waters are navigable,
subject only to the paramount right of the United States to regulated and
improve the navigation of those waters for commercial and public
purposes.” 179 The Circuit Court acknowledged Brewer-Elliott as an exception
to the long established law but dismissed it as “not material in the

173.

Brewer-Elliott, 260 U.S. at 88.

174.

Id. at 85–86.

175.

United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).

176. Frank W. DiCastri, Are All States Really Equal? The ‘Equal Footing’ Doctrine and
Indian Claims to Submerged Lands, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 179, 188–89 (1997).
177.

Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 51.

178.

Id. at 55.

179. United States v. Holt State Bank, 294 F. 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1923), aff’d, 270
U.S. 49 (1926).
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consideration of this case.” 180 Then, quoting Lamprey at length, the Circuit
Court dismissed the United States’ claim to title. 181 The Supreme Court held
that this particular aspect of the lower courts’ decisions was in error. In
support of the proposition that the question of navigability “is necessarily a
question of federal law to be determined according to the general rule
recognized and applied in the federal courts,” the Court cited Brewer-Elliott. 182
“Navigability,” the Court directed, “when asserted as the basis of a right
arising under the Constitution of the United States, is necessarily a question
of federal law to be determined according to the general rule recognized and
applied in the federal courts.” 183 Although not calling too much attention to
the sweeping change this decision made on the settled legal landscape,
Justice Van Devanter offered some justification for the rule: “To treat the
question as turning on the varying local rules would give the Constitution a
diversified operation where uniformity was intended.” 184 In United States v.
Utah, which followed Holt by only five years, the United States successfully
quieted title in itself “to the beds of the portion of the Colorado river and
the San Juan river” 185 by arguing that the portions of the rivers in question
were not navigable under the now recognized federal definition. 186 The title
belonged to the riparian landowners along their banks—which happened to
be the United States government. 187 Thus, the “Brewer-Holt-Utah trilogy . . .
established that navigability for the purpose of determining title was a
federal law question to be decided by federal courts.” 188 This is the origin of
the “equal footing doctrine” as applied today.

B. Considerations of the Equal Footing Doctrine as Applied
to Navigable Waters
In a unanimous 2012 decision, the Court in PPL Montana asserted that
“any ensuing questions of navigability for determining state riverbed title are
governed by federal law” since title to these lands “was ‘conferred not by
Congress but by the Constitution itself’” under the equal-footing doctrine. 189

180.

Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 165–66.

181.

Id. at 165 (quoting Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn.1893)).

182.

Id. at 55–56.

183.

Id.

184.

Id. at 56.

185.

United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 90 (1931).

186.

Id. at 71–72.

187.

Id.

188. Rick Best, The Determination of Title to Submerged Lands on Indian Reservations,
61 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (1986).
189.

PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1227.
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The opinion summarized the preceding history, noting that “[s]ome state
courts came early to the conclusion that a State holds presumptive title to
navigable waters whether or not the waters are subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide.” 190 Although implicitly recognizing that states treated the
question as a matter of state law, the Court claimed that “[t]he rule for state
riverbed title assumed federal constitutional significance under the equal
footing doctrine,” 191 and cites a string of 19th century cases, such as Martin
and Pollard, for support. 192 A close examination of the cases cited by the
Court affirms that Brewer-Elliott and Holt were the first cases to affirmatively
assert federal law as the exclusive determination of title to submerged
lands.
One might wonder whether it is sound policy or somehow better to
have questions of riverbed title decided by federal as opposed to state law.
The Court in PPL Montana selected its view of the best policy for property
laws and rejected the equally sound policy arguments of twenty-six states.193
The Court expressed some sympathy for the states’ view, but relied on its
own conclusion that the size of the portions in question was large enough to
be administrable by different sovereigns. 194 Furthermore, the Court in PPL
Montana adopted a different test for title than what has been established by
the federal courts for federal regulatory jurisdiction. While the “navigable in
fact” test applied for purposes of federal regulatory jurisdiction generously

190.

PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1227.

191.

Id.

192. Id. (“In 1842, the Court declared that . . . the people of each
State . . . ‘hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under
them,’ subject only to rights surrendered and powers granted by the Constitution to
the Federal Government. In a series of 19th-century cases, the Court determined that
the same principle applied to States later admitted to the Union, because the States
in the Union are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution.”) (quoting Martin v.
Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228–
29 (1845); Knight v. U.S. Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 26–31 (1894)).
193. Amicus Brief in Support of Respondent by Oregon et al., PPL Mont., 132
S.Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218) (arguing that “[a] test for navigability that excludes
segments of navigable rivers from a state’s title would severely hamper public use of
the river by creating segments under private control that could exclude the public”).
194. PPL Mont., 132 S.Ct. at 1231 (citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 682–84 (1998)). Note that the Supreme Court, in
making this point, cites a Harvard Law Review article regarding the consequences of
“overdivision.” This is a purely subjective analysis of policy concerns related to
property law—what has always been a traditional domain of the state.
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disregards portability, 195 the now separate “navigable-in-fact” test applied for
purpose of title looks closely at the length of any given portage—effectively
reducing the public domain in many states.
If Holt was the point at which the equal footing doctrine required a
federal definition of navigable waters, it is proper to inquire what the
doctrine meant for navigable waters prior to Holt. From the federal cases
that reference the doctrine prior to Holt, there appears to be two ways to
answer this question: Either the equal-footing doctrine assures that each
state succeeded to nothing less than English common law formulation or it
guaranteed to the states the power as sovereign to define navigable waters.
One of the only cases in which the Supreme Court invoked the equal-footing
doctrine outside of submerged lands provides a useful analog to
understanding this latter theory.
In Coyle v. Smith, the Supreme Court rejected a bill that conditioned
Oklahoma’s admittance to the union on where the State placed its capitol. 196
The Court considered the right of the state to make this decision an inherent
aspect of its sovereignty, protected by the equal-footing doctrine. 197
Invoking the equal footing doctrine to hold that every state must abide by
the same common law definition of navigable waters for purposes of title
would be like holding that since most states placed capitols along a welltravelled highway in the center of the state, all new states would have to do
the same to be on an equal footing. The difference between equal footing as
applied in Coyle and equal footing as applied to determine title of
submerged lands is the difference between an equal right to selfdetermination and an equal outcome to an already decided question. Of
course, one of the problems with concluding that the outcome had to be
equal is that the states, prior to this reading of the equal footing doctrine,
had not, as PPL Montana suggests, developed a consistent rule for what were
to be considered navigable waters. Understanding that the legal definition
of “navigability” for purposes of title had been a state law question puts the
“equal footing doctrine” on its head. Unlike their forbearers, new states were
deprived of the right as sovereign to determine the most appropriate rule
regarding public ownership of submerged lands for their own geography and
culture. In this sense, new states were treated rather unequally under the
equal-footing doctrine and all states found themselves constrained.

195.

PPL Mont., 132 S.Ct. at 1231 (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874)).

196.

Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579–80 (1911).

197.

Id. at 563–66.
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VI. The Persistence of Public Use Rights in Private Waters
The transformation of navigable waters for purposes of title from a
state to federal question had two effects. The first, as noted, was that states
suddenly found themselves losing disputes over ownership of submerged
lands (as was the case in Brewer-Elliot, Holt Bank, and Utah). The second effect
was that states began to protect public use of water through other legal
doctrines that do not depend on the status of title to the underlying
streambed. In 1961, the Wyoming State Supreme Court for example,
decided that title to submerged land was irrelevant to the public’s right to
use public waters. 198 The recognition of public rights and interests based on
state law in waters and submerged land that, under federal law, are privately
owned leads to the federal/state law conflict identified but not resolved in
PPL Montana.
While many state courts have invoked the public trust doctrine as a
basis for recognizing public use rights in otherwise private waters, it is not
the exclusive or oldest legal basis for doing so: “public use of navigable
surface waters may be protected under variations of the public easement
theory or the public trust doctrine even though the state has relinquished
bed ownership, or perhaps without regard of subaqueous title.” 199 Joseph
Kinnicut Angell, a prominent author on American law in the early 19th
century, identified three different types of waters: “First, where it is
altogether private, as in the case of shallow streams; secondly, where it is
private property but subject to public use; and, thirdly, where the use and
property are both public.” 200 The following section of this article reviews the
middle category of mixed public use and private ownership. First, the
section analyzes state court decisions that find a traditional “public use
servitude” 201 in private waters; second, the section discusses the more recent
decisions that have invoked the evolving “public trust doctrine.” 202 Both sets
of cases show courts willing to adapt the law to changing public needs—
such as finding a “public highway” as necessary for the timber industry to
float logs 203 to market or finding a “public trust right” to recreational use. 204
198.

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 151 (Wyo. 1961).

199. Leighton L. Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in
Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391, 421 (1970); see R. Timothy Weston, Public
Rights in Pennsylvania Waters, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 515, 516-39 (1976) (discussing the legal
origins of public rights in surface waters).
200.
1840).
201.

See infra Part IV.A.

202.

See infra Part IV.B.

203.
(1882).
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A. The Public Use Servitude
Angell noted in his earlier 1824 treatise that some rivers (such as the
Thames) were “considered as public highways by water,” and as such, private
riparian owners—even in portions above the high-tide—would be liable for
impediments to public use. 205 These rivers, Angell proclaimed, “are called
public rivers not in reference to the property of the river, for that is in the
individuals who own the land, but in reference only to the public use.”206
Several states that had adopted the limited English rule—that only waters
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide were public—subsequently found a
separate “public use servitude” over private streams that otherwise belonged
to a riparian landowner. 207
For example, in Brown v. Chadbourne, the Supreme Court of Maine
sidestepped its previously held view that the riparian owns the property
underlying a river not influenced by the tide by adopting a separate test to
establish where a privately owned river is open to public use. 208 The Maine
court distinguished its rule for title from that of Pennsylvania, where “the
large fresh water rivers, in that State, are altogether public; not only their
waters, but their beds,” 209 and found that the public had a right to use
streams capable of being used “for the floating of vessels, boats, rafts, or
logs.” 210 Importantly, the court further found that this use right was not
established as a prescriptive easement, dependent on showing public use
for some period of time. 211 The court reasoned that “[i[f a stream could be
subject to public servitude, by long use only, many large rivers in newly
settled States, and some in the interior of this State, would be altogether
under the control and dominion of the owners of their beds, and the

204. E.g. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984);
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior
Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719. See Brian A. King, The Public Trust Doctrine and Mixed-Use
Development: The Proposed Golden State Warriors Arena and the Implications for Future
Development on the San Francisco Bay, 20 Hastings W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 461 (2014)
(discussing the public trust as related to development of San Francisco’s waterfront
in the context of the formerly proposed arena for the NBA’s Golden State Warriors).
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community would be deprived of the use of those rivers, which nature has
plainly declared to be public highways.” 212 The test to establish a public
servitude was then simply “whether a stream is inherently and in its nature
capable of being used for the purposes of commerce” including log
floating. 213
Oregon adopted the same separate test to determine whether the
public had use rights in private rivers in Shaw v. Oswego, a dispute in the late
1800’s between a riparian who wanted to build a sawmill by diverting water
from the Tualatin river and a riparian downstream. 214 The downstream
plaintiff alleged that the permanent diversion of water caused him injury
since he owned the bed and banks of the Tualatin River. 215 The mill-\owner
argued, in his defense, that the river was a “public navigable stream” and,
since the state legislature had authorized his diversion, the downstream
riparian could not claim injury. 216 Having previously recognized that a river
capable of being used to float logs could be used for that purpose, the court
turned to consideration of the riparian’s interest in a nonnavigable river
capable of floating logs. 217 The Oregon court took a balanced approach. It
quoted Lord Hale for the English rule, but recognized that some state
“courts have held that upon the large fresh water rivers which are navigable
in fact, the riparian owners do not take to the middle of the river, but that
the state is the owner of the subjacent soil, and the public have an
easement in the river.” 218 Having surveyed both the English rule and
American rule, the court decided that the Tualatin river was ill-suited to
either conclusion. 219 Instead, the Oregon court looked favorably at the
Maine holding in Brown and similar outcomes in Michigan and Wisconsin,
finding that “where a stream is naturally and of sufficient size to float boats
or mill logs, the public have a right to its free use for that purpose.” 220 Since
the downstream riparian was in fact the owner of the submerged land, the
court granted an injunction on the diversion. 221 Interestingly, the Oregon
court suggested that its opinion should not be read as the final say on
whether Oregon recognized an exception to the English rule regarding title
to submerged lands: “It is, perhaps,” the court noted, “proper to remark that
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the facts of this case, not coming within the exception to the common law
principle adopted by some of the courts of the Union, no opinion is
intended to be expressed on that point.” 222
Just as Oregon and Maine adopted “log floating” tests when the timber
industry was an important part of their local economies, courts in the midto late-20th century adopted “recreational use” tests when public
recreational use was increasingly valued. Two cases in this line also reveal
that at least some state courts had not necessarily ceded the argument over
whether federal or state law determined title to the submerged land. Both
the Missouri court in Elder v. Delcour 223 and the Wyoming court in Day v.
Armstrong 224 asserted that title to submerged lands was still a question of
state law, but established public use rights regardless of the title to
submerged lands. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that it previously
“held to the more rigid [English] rule, and with some aggressiveness,” and
therefore could not conclude anything other than the river at issue was
privately owned. 225 On the other hand, the Wyoming Supreme Court refused
to decide on a rule for title to submerged lands because it found the
question irrelevant to determine the extent of public rights in waters. 226
Both courts concluded that the public could make use of the rivers in
question despite the fact that the riparian owner did have or might have title
to the submerged land.
The Missouri court reached its conclusion in Delcour by noting that
ownership of submerged lands did not give a riparian absolute “title and
ownership.” 227 Instead, ownership “was subject to the burdens imposed by
the river,” which included the fact that “he could not divert or obstruct the
flow of the water without civil and criminal liability.” 228 In other words, the
court found that since the waters were public, then, under the appropriate
inquiry, the title to the submerged land was “subject to an easement for
public travel by boat and wading.” 229
While asserting the right of the state to set the rule for ownership, the
Wyoming State Supreme Court in Day also determined that ownership was

222. Shaw, 10 Or. at 383 (“It is . . . perhaps proper to remark that the facts of
this case, not coming within the exception to the common law principle adopted by
some of the courts of the Union, no opinion is intended to be expressed on that
point.”).
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irrelevant to the public’s right to use public waters. 230 In rejecting the
assertion that the federal test of navigability demarcated the extent of public
rights in waters, the court noted that although:
There is an element of paramount control by the Federal
government with respect to navigable waters . . . that superior
right exists only where navigable waters may be used in either
interstate or international commerce. . . . [T]he state may lay
down and follow such criteria for cataloging waters as navigable
or nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and the state may also decide the
ownership of the submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable
or nonnavigable character of waters above them. 231
Although firmly establishing that “the right of every person over or
through whose lands the waters belonging to the State are found or flow . . .
is subject to the State’s right to use and control its waters,” 232 the court
notably provided an exception where “the title of the Federal government . . .
was incumbered when that title passed from the Federal government to the
State upon its admission to the Union.” 233 Then, perhaps knowing that the
right of the state to define navigable waters for purposes of title was in
doubt, the Wyoming court declined to pass judgment on the “criteria used
by courts of different states and of the United States to determine
navigability of waters and ownership of land beneath them.” 234 Instead, the
court decided that ownership of the bed was irrelevant since the state
owned the water overflowing it, 235 and announced that waters capable of
floating were available to the public for such use. 236 Further, the court held
that the public could scrape or touch the bottom of the river, as well as
“disembark and pull, push or carry over shoals, riffles and rapids” as
necessary to realize “the full enjoyment of the public’s easement.” 237 Unlike
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some other states on this point, however, the court explicitly stated that “to
wade or walk the stream remains un unlawful trespass.” 238
The right of states to define navigability for purposes of title—as noted
so clearly in the Day opinion—has not been relinquished without defiance.
In Arkansas v. McIlroy, 239 the Arkansas Supreme Court revisited its definition
of “navigable waters” to ensure that the “finest white water float stream” in
the state could be used by the public for recreation. 240 The State Supreme
Court of Arkansas first recognized that according to its precedent, the “river
is legally navigable if actually navigable and actually navigable if
commercially valuable.” 241 Conceding that the Mulberry River failed to meet
this standard, the court applauded the language of its precedent
anticipating that this definition was subject to change with the changing
culture and needs of the state, 242 and adopted the view that if a river could
“be used for a substantial portion of the year for recreational purposes,” it
was navigable and open to the public. 243 The court’s opinion is somewhat
opaque in terms of what effect the new definition had on title to the
submerged land. The majority mentions “title” only in noting that
navigability is a federal question in “title disputes between the state and
federal governments” but “[o]therwise, the state may adopt their own
definitions.” 244 Reading the opinion closely, it appears that Arkansas’ new
rule was meant to affect title—not just use. For one, the court cited Donnelly
to support its right to define navigable waters. 245 The question at issue in
Donnelly, as previously discussed, was whether Mr. Donnelly, upon the water
of the Klamath River, was on land belonging to the state or the tribe. 246

238.

Day, 362 P.2d at 146.

239.

Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. 659 (Ark. 1980).

240.

McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d.at 662.

241.

Id. at 663.

242. Id. at 663–64 (quoting Barboro v. Boyle, 178 S.W. 378, 380 (Ark. 1915)) (“’It
is the policy of this state to encourage the use of its water courses for any useful or
beneficial purpose. There may be other public uses than the carrying on of
commerce . . . . [T]he waters of the lake could be used for the purpose of flooding
the rice fields and for other agricultural purposes . . . . [T]he banks of the lake may
become more thickly populated, and the water could be used for domestic purposes.
Pleasure resorts might even be built . . . . [T]he water might be needed for municipal
purposes. Moreover, the waters of the lake might be used to a much greater extent
for boating, for pleasure, for bathing, fishing and hunting than they are now used.’”).
243.

Id. at 665.

244. Id. at 663 (citations omitted) (citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243 (1913)).
245.

Id.

246.

See supra text accompanying notes 154–61.
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Second, the Arkansas court cited from its own precedent Lutesville Sand &
Gravel Co. v. McLaughlin—a case which could not be more directly fought over
ownership of the submerged land because it was a dispute over sand and
gravel dredged from the bottom of the Spring River. 247 Finally, Chief Justice
Fogelman recognized in his dissent that the adoption of the recreational use
test would affect the title of submerged land. His dissent deserves to be
quoted if only for the tenor of his disapproval: “The adoption of a so-called
modern test changes a rule of property and apparently divests titles that
have been vested under the prior test. In Arkansas, unlike communist
states, it is the right of private property, not the rights of the public, that
rises above constitutional sanction.” 248

B. The Public Trust Doctrine
Given the ubiquitous application of the public use servitude to protect
and provide public use rights in otherwise privately owned streams, one
might wonder what the “public trust” has to do with public use rights in
waterways at all. Why do courts turn to this doctrine to find public use
rights in public waters? The Wyoming Supreme Court in Day, for example,
noted that the “waters themselves belong to the State and are held in trust
by it for the benefit of the public.” 249 Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court,
in Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, determined that the private
owner of a streambed could not prohibit the public from recreating in the
water since “[t]he . . . public trust doctrine do[es] not permit a private party
to interfere with the public’s right to recreational use of the surface of the
State’s waters.” 250 On the other hand, the Arkansas Supreme Court in McIlroy
only mentioned the public trust in reference to an Ohio opinion, placing the
phrase in quotation marks that suggest a degree of skepticism: “Applying a
‘public trust’ to the Little Miami River, the Ohio court found that the State of
Ohio holds these waters in trust for those Ohioans who wish to use the
stream for all legitimate uses, be they commercial, transformational, or
recreational.” 251 In declaring its new rule for rivers with public use rights, the
Arkansas court did not seem to think the public trust doctrine was a
necessary element.
It might be helpful to start out by declaring what the public trust
doctrine is exactly, but since the public trust doctrine is applied differently
247.
1930).
248.

McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. at 667–69 (Fogleman, C.J., dissenting).

249.

Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961).

250.
1984).
251.
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by each state where it is recognized, finding one consistent definition is
impossible. 252
Blumm generalized the trust doctrine into four
applications: 253 First, the doctrine can be seen as a public easement, “a
property right entitling the public to maintain access to water recourses.” 254
Second, the doctrine is invoked as a defense to takings claims, wherein “the
state need not compensate for limiting or restricting private development of
trust resources because . . . there are no vested rights in trust property.” 255
The third application is as a rule of statutory construction that directs courts
to construe “statutes terminating public trust restrictions . . . narrowly.” 256
Finally, the public trust doctrine also can provide a sort of “hard look”
obligation, wherein the courts impose “procedural requirements in the name
of the public trust.” 257 To see how the doctrine is invoked to provide for
public use rights in water and submerged land, it is helpful to look at a
series of cases related to beaches and then review the 1984 Montana
decision in Curran.
In three relatively recent cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court—where
the public trust doctrine arguably originated some 150 years prior—
expanded the uses protected by the public trust to include recreation,
extended the reach of burdened property to include dry sand beaches, and
found public rights protected by the public trust doctrine even in private
property. The first case, Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The Sea,
was instigated by an oceanfront municipality’s decision to “charge nonresidents higher fees than residents for the use of its beach area.” 258 The
court concluded that the “common law right of access to the ocean in all
citizens of the state” was safeguarded by the public trust doctrine. 259 In
reaching this conclusion, the court recognized “recreation,” in addition to

252. There is a public trust doctrine in federal common law relevant to
determining the status of trust lands granted by the federal government to private
owners prior to statehood. See, e.g., United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
253. Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water
Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 578 (1989).
254.

Id. at 580.

255.

Id. at 577.

256.

Id. at 587.

257. Id. at 592. The more expansive public trust doctrine can be traced to
Joseph Sax and his 1971 book “Defending the Environment.” See JOSEPH L. SAX,
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971). For examples of courts applying this version of
the public trust doctrine see, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983) and Robinson Twp. v. Pa., 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
258. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 48–
49 (N.J. 1972).
259.

Id. at 51.
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traditional trust concerns such as fishing, navigation and commerce. 260 In
the second case, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found that the public “may have a right to cross privately
owned dry sand beaches in order to gain access to the foreshore” in order to
realize the benefit of trust resources. 261 Finally, in Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v.
Atlantis Beach Club, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the public
trust doctrine required that a private club allow public access to an upland
sand beach for a reasonable fee. 262
Once the Montana court in Curran established that the state owned all
of the surface water in the state, 263 it employed an analysis similar to the
New Jersey beach cases: that the state’s ownership is burdened by a public
trust and that the state must ensure the public use of the waters, including
recreation. “In sum,” the court concluded, “we hold that, under the public
trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that
are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard
to streambed ownership or navigability for non-recreational purposes.” 264
One could read the Montana approach as unique to western states that
assert ownership of all surface waters, since the Montana court emphasized
that “the waters [are] owned by the State under the Constitution.” 265
Western states, which use a prior appropriation system to allocate water
rights, claim sovereign ownership of the waters in their state constitutions
and have defended that ownership as being recognized by the Desert Lands
Act. 266 But the states that have the common law riparian regime for
determining water rights have also found public use rights in surface waters

260.

Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 53.

261.
1984).

Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363–64 (N.J.

262.
2005).

Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J.

263.

Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 1984).

264. Id. at 171 (“[A]ny surface waters that are capable of recreational use may
be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for
nonrecreational purposes.”)
265.

Id. at 170.

266. See, e.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
161–62 (1935) (“Congress must have known that innumerable instances would arise
where lands thereafter patented under the Desert Land Act and other lands patented
under the pre-emption and homestead laws, would be in the same locality and
would require water from the same natural sources of supply. In that view, it is
inconceivable that Congress intended to abrogate the common-law right of the
riparian patentee for the benefit of the desert landowner and keep it alive against the
homestead or pre-emption claimant.”).
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via the public trust doctrine, 267 so this aspect of the Montana opinion should
not be overemphasized when discussing the issue more broadly.
Unlike the Wyoming Day decision, the Montana court did not assert a
state right to define navigability for title.
The court stated that
“[n]avigability for use is a matter governed by state law. It is a separate
concept from the federal question of determining navigability for title
purposes.” 268 Like the Wyoming court, however, the outcome of the
Montana opinion is that title to the submerged lands is irrelevant for
establishing public use. Nevertheless, the Montana court must have been
aware that navigability for title was, at least for some time, a state law
question. Not only did the Curran decision cite Day, wherein the Wyoming
court articulated its right to define navigable waters for purpose of title, the
Curran decision cited Lamprey at length. 269 The Lamprey opinion cannot be
understood as anything but a case related to title of the submerged land
since the fight was over the dry land the receding lake left behind. 270 The
court’s reliance on Lamprey and Day, in fact, provides a nice narrative of case
law from 1893, where the issue of ownership was purely a matter of state
law, to 1961, when the Wyoming court still thought title might be an issue of
state law, but found the question irrelevant to determining public use
rights. 271 The narrative concludes with Curran’s holding that title is a matter
of federal law, but title is irrelevant to the question of public use rights. 272 In
an opinion issued by the Montana court the same year as Curran, the court
rejected an argument that permitting public use was a deprivation of a
property right, stating simply that “ownership of the streambed is irrelevant
to determination of public use of the waters for recreational purposes.
Navigability for recreational use is limited, under the Montana Constitution,
only by the capabilities of the waters themselves for such use.” 273 The only
dissenting justice of the seven involved in the Curran decision lamented that
“[b]y adopting the recreational use test . . . this Court . . . may be creating a
procedure whereby valuable property rights are condemned and taken
without payment of compensation.” 274

267. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 457
(Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
268.

Curran, 682 P.2d at 170.

269. Id. at 169 (discussing Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143
(Minn.1893)).
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See Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1139–40.
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Curran, 682 P.2d at 48–52.

272.

Id. at 56.

273.
1984).
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Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Mont.
Curran, 682 P.2d at 173.
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VII. Conclusion
Whatever “equal footing” meant when Thomas Jefferson and his
colleagues put those words to an early draft of the Northwest Ordinance, 275
it was not a rule that new states were bound by a federal definition of public
waters. Nevertheless, that is undoubtedly what the phrase has come to
mean in the modern judicial lexicon. At the same time that federal law has
become the authority for title to submerged lands, state law has expanded
public use rights in the waters above these submerged lands both by use of
the traditional “public servitude” doctrine and by invoking the public trust
doctrine. As was evident from the reaction to the PPL Montana decision, how
these two bodies of law overlap create uncertainty for both private
landowners and the public. Mr. Kennedy argued that Curran was a judicial
taking because title to submerged land is a matter of federal law and the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a “landowner’s right to exclude [is]
‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property.’” 276 Further, Mr. Kennedy cited U.S. Supreme
Court precedent to suggest that any incidental contact with the submerged
land authorized by the state is a taking. 277 On the other hand, some
commentators believe that the public trust doctrine, as a “background
principle” of state property law, may be an effective defense to a taking
challenge. 278
There are really two different uncertainties. First, there is uncertainty
as to the actual nature of property interests in waters that are not navigablein-fact using the segment-by-segment approach. In Tennessee, state
judicial opinions predating the Brewer-Holt-Utah trilogy clearly hold that
temporary disruptions in an otherwise navigable body of water or any
segment thereof do not result in private ownership. 279 The equal footing
doctrine applied by the Supreme Court in PPL Montana put that century-old
principle of state property law in jeopardy. In Montana, a now-settled
principle of state law—that the public may access any water susceptible to
recreational use—has also been thrown into jeopardy. A second, more
profound uncertainty is that property owners and members of the public do

275.

See Barrett, supra note 79, at 765 n.26.

276. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
277. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant James C. Kennedy, supra note 17, at
40 (noting that “where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical
invasion of her property - however minor - it must provide just compensation” (citing
Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005)).
278. See John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles
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not know whether they should refer to federal or state law to resolve these
disputes. Imposing federal law into these title disputes unsettles a longestablished separation of powers principle that property law is reserved for
the states. Of these two uncertainties, the second seems the most
problematic. Many state courts wisely withheld from pronouncing rigid,
inflexible rules about private ownership in water and submerged land. 280
These courts recognized that water will always be of some interest to the
public and that to give away that public interest without reserving the right
to change the rule in the future could lead to dramatic consequences. As
Singer notes, “we care about getting things right and that often requires us
to reformulate rules when they lead to untoward results.” 281
In criticizing the decision of the Montana Supreme Courts, the Court in
PPL Montana quoted Brewer-Elliott: “It is not for a State by courts or
legislature, in dealing with the general subject of beds or streams, to adopt
a retroactive rule for determining navigability which . . . would enlarge what
actually passed to the State, at the time of her admission under” the equalfooting doctrine. 282 At the time most states entered the union, there was not
a rigid rule for what constituted public waters—there were many different
rules applied individually be each of the states. The only thing that was
clear at the time was that state law—not federal law—determined what was
or wasn’t part of the public domain. Thanks to the “equal footing” doctrine,
the future of public rights in water hinges on reference to something that
never was.

280. See Joseph Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1374 (2013) (noting that “standards allow property rights to be adjusted when
they conflict with the property rights of others or when the exercise of property rights
cause externalities or systemic disturbances that undermine the infrastructure of the
property system”).
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